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Abstract 
Interventions in foreign exchange markets are commonly used by monetary 
authorities to influence exchange rates.  Whether or not the interventions are 
symmetrical in response to external shocks representing depreciation or appreciation 
pressures depends on other objectives of the monetary authority.  If the goal of 
maintaining low inflation is more important than exchange-rate stabilization, then when 
inflation is considered to be too high asymmetrical interventions are likely to arise with 
more vigorous interventions to offset depreciation pressures than to offset appreciation 
pressures.  Evidence from Taiwan supports this pattern.   
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Selective Asymmetric Interventions 
 
1.  Introduction 
 There has been a long-standing policy debate on the issue of whether a fixed or 
floating exchange-rate regime insulates a small open economy better from various 
shocks.  Researchers believe that, for inflation-prone countries, a fixed exchange rate 
regime can help to keep inflation down by serving as a discipline on central-bank credit 
creation.  This argument led in the early 1990s to advocacy of currency boards as an 
approach to achieving price stability.  Caprio (1996), Honohan (1997), Jao (1998) and 
Gulde (1999) are examples.  Alternatively, those who favor a floating exchange rate 
regime argue that the fixed regime imposes an undue constraint on the monetary 
authority.  They believe that more flexibility of exchange rates helps insulate domestic 
prices particularly from external shocks.  For example, under a floating exchange 
regime, when an economy experiences inflationary pressures from foreign countries, it 
can offset such pressures by allowing its currency to appreciate at the rate of foreign 
inflation.   
These arguments have stimulated empirical investigations into the experience of 
developed countries which adopted floating regimes in the 1970s.  Genberg, Salemi and 
Swoboda (1987), Hutchison and Walsh (1992) and Lastrapes and Koray (1990) are 
such studies.  Among these, only Lastrapes and Koray (1990) find some evidence in the 
case of the United Kingdom to support the hypothesis that there is superior insulation 





This paper examines the case of a developing country-Taiwan.  Moreno (1994) 
uses a small vector autoregression (VAR) model and impulse responses to assess the 
impact of a set of external disturbances on Taiwan’s price levels under alternative 
exchange rate regimes.  The VAR model consists of an external sector and a domestic 
sector.  The external disturbances include a foreign oil price shock and a set of shocks 
proxied by U.S. macroeconomic variables.  The domestic sector is represented by 
Taiwan’s CPI.  Moreno’s study suggests that Taiwan’s price level became more stable 
after the government adopted the floating exchange-rate regime.   
Do relatively stable price levels under the floating regime result from better 
control of the money supply by Taiwan’s monetary authority in this period?  Lin and 
Wu (1994) claim, in an empirical study, that the quantity theory of money does not hold 
in Taiwan.  Since the 1980s, a large gap has existed between annual growth rates of the 
money supply (M1 and M2) and of real GNP without much price inflation.  This 
phenomenon was especially apparent during the period of 1986-1988.  Despite growth 
rates in M1B and M2 well in excess of growth rates in GNP, the CPI experienced very 
low inflation and the WPI actually fell during those three years.  According to Lin and 
Wu (p. 185):  “…during the period of 1985-1989, the New Taiwan dollar experienced 
an appreciation of 33.69 percent against US dollar.  Because of this appreciation of the 
NT dollar, the import price index was decreasing in the later 1980s.”  
These events clearly show that the exchange rate can be an important element in 
Taiwan’s price level.  A high growth rate in the money supply will not necessarily 





sufficiently.  It follows that Taiwan’s exchange rate management can have an impact on 
domestic price levels.  Moreno’s study (1994) concludes that the Taiwan government 
managed its exchange rates in the 1980s in a manner that contributed to insulating its 
domestic price levels from external shocks.  This, however, does not answer the further 
question:  What types of government management of exchange rates were used to 
achieve domestic price stability under the floating exchange regime?  Our paper 
addresses this question.   
We focus specifically on how changes in the yen/dollar rate influenced 
interventions by the Taiwan central bank.  Press reports and statistical evidence indicate 
that changes in the Yen/US$ rate tend to move the New Taiwan dollar (US$/NT$) in 
the opposite direction.   We therefore interpret an increase in the Yen/US$ rate as 
creating depreciation pressure on the Taiwanese currency and a decrease in the 
Yen/US$ rate as creating appreciation pressure.  If a depreciating currency puts upward 
pressure on domestic prices, then a leaning-against-the-wind policy by the Taiwan 
central bank of selling dollars when the dollar appreciates against the yen will tend to 
offset the upward pressure on domestic prices in Taiwan.  Similarly, buying dollars by 
the Taiwan central bank when the dollar depreciates against the yen will tend to offset a 
downward pressure on domestic prices. 
To smooth out these external shocks on domestic prices and maintain 
international reserves, interventions by the Taiwan central bank can be expected to be 
relatively symmetrical.  However, when the central bank is concerned about an existing 





pressures, which could aggravate inflation, than to appreciation pressures, which could 
reduce inflation.  Evidence supports this prediction. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes 
Taiwan’s exchange rate policy and economic background.  Section 3 presents Granger-
causality tests between Yen/US$ and NT$/US$.  Section 4 reports regression analyses 
that support the hypothesis that the asymmetries in responding to depreciation and 
appreciation pressures arise primarily during periods of relatively high inflation.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Taiwan’s exchange rate policy and economic background 
2.1.  Exchange rate policy and intervention operations 
Prior to February 1979, the NT$ was pegged to the U.S. dollar (US$), and all 
foreign exchange transactions required government approval.  Since February 1979, 
Taiwan’s foreign exchange market has been a managed float.  Figure 1 shows the 
Yen/US$ and US$/NT$ exchange rates from 1971:1 to 1998:12.  There is an evident 
inverse pattern between the two series.  We examine the direction of causation below.  
In the first half of the 1980s, the U.S. dollar appreciated against the yen and 
other currencies, including the NT$.  As a result, Taiwan had large trade surpluses with 
the United States and accumulated substantial foreign assets denominated in US$.  See 
Figure 2 and 3.  These considerable holdings of foreign assets enabled Taiwan to 
engage later in relatively large interventions.  In the second-half of the 1980s, the NT$ 





2.2.  The degree of openness and major trade partners 
An economy with a relatively high degree of openness will be affected more by 
external shocks than an economy with a low degree of openness.  Taiwan is a very open 
economy.  The ratio of its exports plus imports to GDP has been in the range from 71 to 
87 percent in the years of active intervention from 1985 to 1998.  A good portion of that 
trade has been with the U.S. and with Japan.  This suggests that a change in the 
Yen/US$ rate can be an important external shock. 
2.3.  Extent of interventions 
The Taiwan monetary authority regularly claims that it will intervene in 
response to external shocks but does not publish the extent of its interventions.  There 
are end-of-month data on total international reserves valued in U.S. dollars (IRt).  The 
monthly changes are shown as the solid line in Figure 4.  To construct estimates of how 
much of these changes are the result of interventions, we need to adjust for interest 
earned and changes in the dollar values of the yen and mark reserves. 
In a 1997 Taiwan Commercial Times, Mr. Chou A-Ting, who is the president of 
Taiwan Foreign Exchange Bureau, claims that the rate of return on Taiwan’s foreign 
assets is approximately equal to that of US government bonds.  We use concurrent 
monthly U.S. 1-year Treasury bill rate (TBR) as the proxy of the rate of return on 
Taiwan’s foreign assets to get estimates of increases in reserves as a result of interest 
earned.1  
Taiwan’s foreign assets consist primarily of US$, Deutsche mark (DM) and Yen 





We interpolated between times when relative shares are reported to estimate monthly 
fractions held in DM and Yen.  
The change in the dollar value of DM reserve assets from month t-1 to t can be 
calculated by (IRt-1)*(share of DM assets)*[(1+TBR)*(DM/US$)t-1*(US$/DM)t -1].  
The change in Yen reserve assets from month t-1 to t is calculated by the same 
procedure.  Reserve assets other than DM and Yen, mostly US$ assets, also earn 
interest from month t-1 to t: (IRt-1)*(total shares of other assets)*(TBR).  Adding the 
changes in the value of DM and Yen assets plus interest earned by other assets from 
month t-1 to t, we obtain the changes in foreign assets without interventions.  See 
Figure 4.  Estimates of the monthly net interventions are then obtained by subtracting 
changes attributable to interest earnings and valuation changes from total change in 
reserve assets.  
Figure 5 depicts the resulting estimated magnitude of Taiwan’s net interventions 
each month from Feb. 1979, when floating began, through Oct. 1998.  These will be 
denoted ∆FAt in subsequent analysis.  As is evident in Figure 5, the Taiwan monetary 
authority started to impose large and frequent interventions approximately after the 
1985 Plaza agreement.   
  
3.  Granger causality test  
As noted earlier, there are evident inverse movements between Yen/US$ and 
US$/NT$.   A long-existing consensus, among Taiwan monetary authorities, is that the 





the US$.  As indicative of this consensus, we present two statements, from among many 
prior news accounts.  Both have been presidents of the Taiwan Central Bank.   
In April, 1989, in the Taiwan Economic Daily, Mr. Chang Chi-Cheng, as a 
former president from 1984-1989, claims:  “Currently, the exchange rate of NT$/US$ is 
fundamentally reasonable.  The temporary appreciation pressure of NT dollar against 
US dollar is due to further depreciation of US dollar against yen.”      
In the Commercial Times in May, 1998, Mr. Peng Huai-Nan, who became 
president of the central bank in 1998, says:  “Recently, NT$ depreciates against US$ is 
the result of US$ appreciates against yen.  A drop in the value of NT$ against US$ does 
not reflect domestic fundamentals.”      
Note that both statements indicate a belief that causation runs from the Yen/US$ 
to the US$/NT$ and not the other way.  Since the NT$ market is very small relative to 
the yen and dollar markets, one would intuitively expect this.  We can examine it more 
formally by means of Granger-causality tests.   
Let the monthly change in Yen/US$ be denoted by tS∆ , and the monthly change 
in US$/NT$ be denoted by tE∆  for the time period 1982:10-1998:10.
2  The Schwarz 
information criteria, denoted as SIC, for choosing the order of the VAR are reported in 
the upper half of Table 1 together with the Lagrange multiplier test statistics, denoted as 
LM, for serial correlation.  Lag order of 1 is preferred for both single equation and 
system criteria on the basis of a minimum SIC.   
The lower half of Table 1 reports the test statistics for Granger-causation with a 





The F statistic of 4.944, with a p-value of .027, calls for rejecting Ho1 and accepting the 
alternative hypothesis that ∆St does cause ∆Et.  In the regression of ∆Et on ∆Et-1 and 
∆St-1, note the significant negative coefficient on ∆St-1.  An appreciation in the US$ 
relative to the yen (∆St-1 > 0) tends to result in a depreciation of NT$ relative to the US$ 
(∆Et < 0).  
Furthermore, we cannot reject Ho2: tE∆ does not Granger-cause tS∆ .  In other 
words, as would be expected, there is no evidence of an effect of changes in US$/NT$ 
on subsequent changes in Yen/US$.   
On the basis of these results, as well as press reports, we will refer to an increase 
in Yen/US$ as generating depreciation pressures in Taiwan and to a decrease in 
Yen/US$ as generating appreciation pressures.                   
 In a vector autoregression analysis, similar to one carried out by Moreno (1994), 
shocks to Yen/US$ had a smaller impulse-response effect on prices in Taiwan after 
1985, when there were substantial interventions, than between 1979 and 1985, when 
interventions were on a much smaller scale.  The implication of this analysis, available 
on request, is that intervention policy after 1985 somehow mitigated the effects of 
changes in Yen/US$ on prices in Taiwan. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis of intervention responses to Yen/US$ changes. 
We now investigate how the Taiwan monetary authority responded to 





were unusually large changes in foreign assets, such as months labeled in Figure 4, 
reveal a pattern in the intervention strategy.3   
When there is not an inflation problem within the economy, the monetary 
authority focuses on exchange-rate stability and uses lean-against-the-wind 
interventions to respond to both appreciation and depreciation pressures.  Also, 
interventions are largely sterilized to maintain stable interest-rate levels.4   
With an existing inflation problem within the economy, however, the use of 
interventions is crucially influenced by the direction of exchange-rate pressures.  When 
facing depreciation pressures, interventions of selling US$ are consistently used without 
being sterilized.  The reason for not sterilizing these interventions is to withdraw money 
from the economy to offset the existing inflation pressures.  When facing appreciation 
pressures, the monetary authority tends not to intervene as actively since an 
appreciation helps reduce inflation pressures by lowering the prices for imported goods.  
This pattern can be subjected to a more formal statistical analysis, using 
monthly data for the sample period from 1985:10 to 1998:10.  As can be seen in Figure 
5, these are years in which substantial interventions occurred.  
4.1.  Test of intervention patterns without inflation criterion 
We first examine how the Taiwan monetary authority’s interventions responded 
to fluctuations in the Yen/US$ exchange rate (∆St).  We partition the data into months 
with depreciation pressures (in which ∆St was positive) and into months with 
appreciation pressures (in which ∆St was negative).  This is accomplished by defining 





(D2,t) and multiplying them by the change in the Yen/US$ rate.  The resulting 
regression equation takes the form: 
∆FAt =α + 1β D1,t × ∆St + 2β D2,t × ∆St + 3β ∆FAt-1 + 4β ∆FAt-3 + 5β ∆FAt-6 + tε   (1) 
subject to       D1,t = 1 if tS∆ > 0; D1,t = 0 otherwise, and    
                      D2,t = 1 if tS∆ < 0; D2,t = 0 otherwise. 
where ∆FAt is the amount of Taiwan’s interventions denominated in millions of US 
dollars; a positive value is a purchase of foreign assets, usually U.S. dollars, and sale of 
the NT$.  ε t is an error term.  All variables are in logarithms.  Three significant lags of 
the dependent variable (∆FAt-1, ∆FAt-3, and ∆FAt-6) are included in the regression to 
eliminate the serial correlation among the residuals5.   
When tS∆ > 0 and there is depreciation pressure, we expect any intervention to 
be a sale of foreign assets (∆FAt < 0).  This should result in a negative β1 coefficient.  
When tS∆ < 0 and there is appreciation pressure, we expect any intervention to be a 
purchase of foreign assets (∆FAt > 0) and hence give rise to a negative β2 coefficient. 
 The results from estimating equation (1) with OLS, reported in the second 
column of Table 2, indicate that lean-against-the-wind interventions were used in the 
sample period and that the Taiwan monetary authority may have made somewhat more 
of an effort to offset depreciation pressures than appreciation pressures ( 1β = -.2045 and 
2β = -.1157).   
This analysis, however, does not take account inflation concerns.   We turn next 
to an examination of how Taiwan’s interventions responded to fluctuations in the 





4.2. Test of intervention patterns with inflation criterion 
Official inflation claims have been taken from two Taiwan local newspapers, 
Economic Daily News and Commercial Times, as well as several publications reported 
by Dow Jones Interactive.  Concerns about the level of inflation were found in 43 of the 
157 months6.   
We now have four partitions of the data.  In equation (1), we had a two-way 
partition of the data into periods of depreciation pressures (when tS∆ > 0) and periods 
of appreciation pressures (when tS∆ < 0).  For equation (2) below, we now split each of 
those into whether or not inflation is high enough to be considered a problem for the 
central bank.  In the new dummy variables, a subscript 1 denotes depreciation pressure 
and a subscript 2 denotes appreciation pressures.  The superscripts are 1 if there is no 
inflation problem and 2 if there is an inflation problem. 
We ran an OLS regression for the following equation: 
∆FAt =α + 1β tt SD ∆×
1
,1 + 2β tt SD ∆×
1
,2 + 3β tt SD ∆×
2
,1 + 4β tt SD ∆×
2
,2  
+ 5β ∆FAt-1 + 6β ∆FAt-3  + 7β ∆FAt-6 + tε    (2) 
subject to  1,1 tD = 1 if no inflation problem and tS∆ > 0; 
1
,1 tD = 0 otherwise,    
1
,2 tD = 1 if no inflation problem and tS∆ < 0; 
1
,2 tD = 0 otherwise,     
2
,1 tD = 1 if inflation problem and tS∆ > 0; 
2
,1 tD  = 0 otherwise, and 
2
,2 tD = 1 if inflation problem and tS∆ < 0; 
2
,2 tD = 0 otherwise.                                  
 
The last column of Table 2 reports OLS regression results.  The moderately significant 
negative coefficients on both tt SD ∆×
1
,1  and tt SD ∆×
1





without the presence of an inflation problem in the economy, the Taiwan monetary 
authority tended to intervene symmetrically to depreciation or appreciation pressures 
after the Plaza Agreement.  The symmetry is reflected in the similar coefficients (β1 = -
.1599 and β2 = -.1480).       
Unlike the symmetric results for 1β  and 2β , the results for 3β  and 4β  show 
evidence of asymmetric responses between currency depreciation and appreciation 
pressures when an inflation problem exists in the economy.  The highly significant 
negative sign on tt SD ∆×
2
,1  implies that the Taiwan monetary authority used lean-
against-the-wind interventions to respond to depreciation pressures when there were 
inflation concerns.  The coefficient on tt SD ∆×
2
,2  is very close to zero
7. 
  Thus, the slight asymmetry noted for equation (1) is evidently the result of 
asymmetric interventions during periods when inflation is considered to be too high.  
The monetary authority does not generally intervene to counter appreciation pressures 
when there is an existing inflation problem.            
 
4.3. Test of intervention as an anti-inflation policy per se 
A natural question is whether this asymmetry simply reflects the use of 
exchange-rate interventions as a general anti-inflation policy.  To check that, we ran 
three additional regressions.  The first is with inflation in the CPI, denoted cpitINF , as 
the explanatory variable:   
FAt =α + 1β × 
cpi





The second equation adds the inflation variable to equation (1): 
 
FAt = α + 1β × D1,t × St  + 2β × D2,t × St  + 3β  × 
cpi
tINF + 4β FAt-1 
+ 5β FAt-3 + 6β FAt-6 + tε        (4)                                        
    subject to    D1,t = 1 if tS∆ > 0; D1,t = 0 otherwise, and                                                                            
           D2,t = 1 if tS∆ < 0; D2,t = 0 otherwise. 
 
The third equation modifies (4) by considering only periods of inflation concerns: 
FAt = α + 1β × D1,t × St  + 2β × D2,t × St  + 3β  × D3,t × 
cpi
tINF + 4β FAt-1 
+ 5β FAt-3 + 6β FAt-6 + tε      (5) 
subject to    D1,t = 1 if tS∆ > 0; D1,t = 0 otherwise;                                                                            
           D2,t = 1 if tS∆ < 0; D2,t = 0 otherwise and  
           D3,t = 1 if inflation problem; D3,t = 0 otherwise.  
 
The OLS results are reported in Table 3.  Since the coefficients of cpitINF  are never 
significantly different from zero, there is no evidence that the Taiwan monetary 
authority used interventions to offset inflation alone after the Plaza Agreement. 
 
5.  Conclusion   
 Regression analysis supports the hypothesis that when there is an existing 
inflation problem, interventions will be much stronger in resisting depreciation 
pressures, which would aggravate inflation, than appreciation pressures, which would 
alleviate inflation.   
Such asymmetric intervention, resisting depreciation pressures more strongly 





country.  One might expect a bias toward encouraging depreciation in order to maintain 
greater competitiveness in international markets.  In the case of Taiwan, however, a 
goal of stabilizing domestic price levels is evidently of higher priority than stabilizing 
exchange rates.   
A critical issue for inflation targeting in small open economies is the role of the 
exchange rate.  Mishkin and Savastano (2000) studied Latin American experiences and 
argued that reluctance to accept exchange rate fluctuations through the use of 
interventions or currency board would make inflation targeting unsuccessful.  This is 
because responding too frequently to exchange rate fluctuations would run the risk of 
transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor that takes precedence over the 
inflation target.  The evidence from Taiwan is that selective intervention has helped 
achieve price stability.  The experience of Taiwan has not been to use interventions as a 
general anti-inflation device, nor to peg the exchange rate, but as an aid in insulating 
domestic price levels from external shocks arising from changes in the Yen/US$ 
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Total Change in Foreign Assets
Changes in Foreign Assets from Changes in DM, Yen Assets and Interest Earned   
 






































































































Change in Foreign Assets from Government Interventions
 
Fig. 5.  Taiwan's magnitude of interventions under the floating exchange system.  Positive (negative) change in foreign assets 


















VAR order selection and test statistics for Granger-causalitya b 
VAR order selection 
 
 Single-equation criteria: tE∆  
Lag order 1 2 3 







 Single-equation criteria: tS∆  
Lag order 1 2 3 
SIC -8.373 -8.322 -8.271 
LM(1:12) 10.853        
[0.542] 
8.958        
[0.707] 
8.736        
[0.725] 
 System criteria 
Lag order 1 2 3 
SIC -18.450 -18.363 -18.309 
 
Granger-causality test statistics 
 
 Ho1: tS∆ does not Granger-cause tE∆ ? 
Lag order 1 
F test 4.944 
[.027]* 
 tE∆ = -0.0002 + 0.1180 1−∆ tE - 0.0734 1−∆ tS + tε  
           [0.641]   [0.113]              [0.027]* 
  
 Ho2: tE∆ does not Granger-cause tS∆ ? 
Lag order 1 
F test .0005 
[.983] 
 tS∆ = -0.0013 + 0.1753 1−∆ tS + 0.0036 1−∆ tE + tε  
           [0.220]    [0.021]*          [0.983] 
a LM(1:12) is Breusch- Godfrey autocorrelation test of order 1 to 12.  






OLS regression on equations (1) and (2): Estimated coefficients and diagnostic test statisticsa 
 No price factors With price factors 
Coefficients of Explanatory 
Variables and test statistics 





















Appreciation, no inflation problem: 
tt SD ∆×
1
,2   
 -.1480** 
[.049] 




























Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation  
test of order (1 to x): 
  






















Adjusted R2 .4771 .4764 









OLS regressions for equations (3), (4) and (5): Estimated coefficients and diagnostic test statisticsa   
Coefficients of Explanatory  
variables and test statistics 














Cases of depreciation: 





Cases of appreciation: 






























autocorrelation test  
of order (1 to x): 
   






























Adjusted R2 .4305 .4765 .4741 





















1 One could perhaps use 3-year or 10-year Treasury bill rate, but this would make only negligible changes in the 
estimation. 
2 Both variables, tS∆ and tE∆ , used in the VAR system are stationary, so that the test statistics have standard 
distributions.  Concerning the test period, it is observed, from figure 1, that the value of NT$ against US$ has little 
fluctuation prior to 1982, therefore we perform the test from 1982:01.  
3 Notice that a large change in foreign assets is not necessarily associated with a large intervention.  This is most 
notable for March 1995 when valuation changes were substantial.  A detailed account of what happened during each 
of the 11 months labeled in Figures 4 and 5 is available on request.      
4 Interest rate stability has been one of Taiwan’s economic targets, since the government tries to maintain a favorable 
investment environment. To maintain low and stable interest rates, low and stable inflation rates are necessary.  This 
may partially explain why the Taiwan government always keeps a close watch on its inflation rates.    
5 This is so-called “general-to-specific” approach, pioneered by David Hendry, and it has been developed at length by 
its advocates.  For general discussions of  “general-to-specific” approach, see Hendry (1995). 
6 In the news accounts four different inflation rates are mentioned at various times.  These are inflation rates over the 
preceding 12 months for the CPI, MPI (imported price index), and WPI as well as monthly inflation rates for the MPI.  
Annual inflation rate, however, is the dominating factor.  The average annual inflation rates from 114 cases (without 
inflation problem) and from 43 cases (with inflation problem) are 2% and 4.38%, respectively.  A statistical analysis 
shows that CPI inflation was the dominant variable. 
7 Because of the relatively high standard error on the estimate of β4, we cannot decisively reject the hypothesis that β3 
= β4.  The p-value for the test statistic was 0.15. 
